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THE ENGEL CASE FROM A SWISS PERSPECTIVE

F. William O'Brien*
June 25, 1962, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the State of New York, by using its public school system
to encourage recitation of a prayer during classroom hours, had
adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with that clause of the first
amendment, applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment, which prohibits laws respecting an establishment of
religion. 1 The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Black
for himself and four other Justices, is interesting in that he rests
the Court's decision exclusively upon the establishment clause.
In previous decisions, 2 the Court had not stated clearly that state
action in contravention of this provision of the first amendment
would fall under its ban even though religious freedom might
be unimpaired. The present Court has now made this point clear
beyond doubt. 3
In the ensuing pages, the Engel decision will be surveyed from
the unique vantage point of the Swiss terrain. Such a study in
comparative law hopefully facilitates an interchange of ideas
among the peoples of various countries on how to handle common problems. For Americans, the experience of the Swiss with
problems in the area of church-state relations would seem to be
of unusual value. Switzerland is a country with a long history of
various types of state churches. To this day established religions
exist in most of its cantons. Nonetheless, the cantonal constitutions as well as that of the Swiss Confederation are replete with

O

N

• Professeur de Droit Constitutionnel, Universite de Fribourg, Fribourg, Suisse; formerly at Georgetown University.-Ed.
1 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), where the Court first "incorporated"
the establishment clause, religious freedom was the major issue. In Mccollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the question of religious liberty was not pressed and
the Court's opinion is cloudy, but it appears that the Court perceived at least some
element of restraint. As for Mrs. McCollum's original position, see Mccollum v. Board
of Educ., 396 Ill. 14, 23, 71 N.E.2d 161, 165 (1947); Records of the Proceedings of the
Circuit Court of Champaign County 190-216, 231. These records demonstrate clearly
that she did not claim an infringement of religious freedom. Like many others, Mr.
Justice Reed pointed out the lack of clarity in the opinions of his brethren on the
bench, stating: "I find it difficult to extract from the opinions any conclusion as to
what it is in the Champaign plan that is unconstitutional." McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 240 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
3 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962). Mr. Justice Douglas stated explicitly
that "there is no element of compulsion or coercion in New York's regulation." Id.
at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Stewart wrote that "the Court does not
hold, nor could it, that New York has interfered with the free exercise of anybody's
religion." Id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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clauses protecting religious liberty. And the manner in which
the Swiss guard religious freedom while maintaining officially established churches should prove of interest to American students
of the Engel decision. An additional reason recommending the
present study is that the political institutions of Switzerland and
the democratic instincts of its citizens are remarkably similar to
those characteristic of the Anglo-American tradition.4 Deserving
special notice is the federal structure of its government, which was
adopted in 1848 after a careful examination of the features of the
federal system established by the Constitution of the United States.
For many others who have discussed the Engel case, to pray
or not to pray-that is the question. For this writer, the prime
question is one involving the nature of federalism. The decision
not to provide for public prayers in certain schools where religious
tensions are high and where agreement on formula is difficult
would indeed be the better part of wisdom. But the question of
who should make this decision, and upon what grounds, is of the
greatest importance. In discussing the willingness of the Supreme
Court to accept this responsibility in analogous circumstances,
Professor Corwin wrote prophetically in 1948 that "this may in
the long run prove to be its [the case's] most important phase."u
In this regard, a study of how the problems presented in Engel
v. Vitale would be disposed of in Switzerland, within the framework of its federal system of government, and with its emphasis on
democracy and liberty, notwithstanding the multitude of official
churches in its cantons, should prove enlightening. 6
4 BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 327 (1921); CODDING, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
SWITZERLAND 55 (1961); MooRE, MODERN CoNsrITUTIONS 241 (1957).
5 Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB.
9 (1948).
6 This article does not concern itself with the mass of historical events responsible
for these various church-state arrangements. Nor does it include in its compass the
many philosophical and theological traditions which conditioned them. Those interested
in ascertaining similarities between the Swiss and the American traditions may find
satisfaction in comparing the theocracy founded by John Calvin in Geneva in 1536 with
the early New England theocracies, directly traceable to Calvin's influence. In referring
to the American experience, this author prescinds from why or how religious establishments or separation happened to exist in the various states in 1789. The article treats
solely the provisions written into the Constitution in response to the factual situation
then obtaining. Readers who care to deal with the enormously complicated study of the
theological and philosophical thought that went into-and came out of-these churchstate arrangements in the two countries are referred to the following, inter alia: ANDERSON, JACOBSON'S DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 1-71 (2d ed. 1960);
BEARD, BASIC H1sroRY OF THE UNITED STAT.ES 14-23- (1944); 3 DIERAUER, HISTOIRE DE LA
CONFEDERATION DE LA SUISSE 17-651 (1910); 5 id. 738-935; GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT passim (1940); PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT (1930); Morison, The Puritan Tradition, in UNDERsrANDING THE AMERICAN PAST
67-79 (Saveth ed. 1954); Bridenbaugh, The Virginians, in id. 80-93.
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In Switzerland the word "establishment" is found neither in
the federal constitution nor in the constitution of any of the
twenty-five cantons and half-cantons. Nonetheless, students of
Swiss institutions agree that the majority of cantons do have officially established churches. 7 Practically, the central government
can recognize no one particular religion, but the federal constitution guarantees to the cantons the right to maintain their own
state churches or to introduce "separation" should they desire.
This guarantee is found in article 3 which provides: "The
Cantons are sovereign as far as their sovereignty is not limited by
the Federal Constitution, and as such they exercise all the rights
which are not delegated to the federal power.'' 8
It was by virtue of this provision that the highest federal organs with jurisdiction in the matter have ruled that the central
government may make no laws respecting the establishment of
religion in the cantons. In I 878 the Conseil Federal, the federal
executive body, consisting of seven members, elected by the National Assembly, held: "The Cantons have, by the Federal Constitution, the power to regulate as they judge proper the external
relations between the State and the different churches existing on
their territory ... .'' 9 In 1929 the Tribunal Federal-the "Supreme Court" of Switzerland-stated explicitly that there was no
prohibition in the Constitution against the establishment of state
churches by the cantons and that this did not as such violate religious liberty. 10 All authorities admit that this power flows directly from cantonal sovereignty as protected from federal invasion
by article 3. A renowned scholar included this remark in an
address at the University of Lausanne in 1962:
"The principle of our federal state is to reserve to its members, the cantons, sovereignty in those domains where power
ought to be held as close as possible to one's person and conscience. These sacredly reserved domains are: that of public
education, that of church-state relations, that of the minority
tongues." 11
7 CODDING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 53; HUGHES, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SwITZERL\ND 63 (1954).
8 Note the similarity of the language of the tenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the
people."
o FEUILLE Ftni:RALE IV, 404 (1878) [hereinafter cited as F.F.]. The Conseil Federal
hears many appeals which in the United States would go to the courts.
10 Romisch-Katholiche Kirchgemeinde Buren v. Regierungsrat Solthum, REcuEIL
OrFICIEL DES .Arutt-rs DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 55, I, 113, 129 (1929).
11 Address of Professor Gonzague de Reynold, printed in Fribourg's La Liberte,
Aug. 1, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
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George Sauser-Hall, whose book Guide Politique Suisse is a vade
mecum in Switzerland, has written:
"Thus the cantons have the power to regulate as they please
the relations of the churches with the State.... Most of the
Swiss cantons have adopted the system of State Churches where
the State recognizes that one or several Churches are those
of the majority of its inhabitants. It organizes these Churches,
subsidizes them or maintains them completely, and accords
them certain privileges which it refuses to the other faiths.
The official Churches thus bear the name of national
Churches. This is the system which is in effect in most of
the Protestant cantons and in a great number of the Catholic
cantons." 12
Enough has now been said to suggest that, if a situation such
as that presented in the Engel case arose in Switzerland, the
grounds for solution would be quite different from that upon
which the Supreme Court rested its decision. But, although the
"establishment" argument could not be invoked, there are several
other provisions in the Swiss federal constitution that are relevant.
Article 27 provides, in paragraph three, that "the public schools
shall be such that they may be attended by adherents of all religious sects without any offense to their freedom of conscience
or belief." Paragraphs one and two of article 49 stipulate: "Freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable. . . . No one may be
compelled to be a member of a religious association, to receive
a religious education, to take part in a religious ceremony, or to
suffer punishment of any sort by reason of religious opinion."
Before considering how the above guarantees would be applied
to a set of facts such as those presented in the Engel case, it is
interesting to note that the Swiss courts are totally excluded from
handling questions regarding the operation of the public school
system. Article 125 of the Federal Law on Organization of the
Judiciary provides that appeals from the cantons on questions
involving paragraphs two and three of article 27 must be made
to the Conseil Federal. Article 132 provides for appeals to the
Assembly from decisions of the Conseil Federal. It should be
noted here that the Tribunal Federal does not possess the power
of judicial review and therefore it cannot nullify acts of the other
organs of the central government.13 Nor does any cantonal court,
12

SAUSER-HALL, GumE PoLlTIQUE SmssE 136-37 (16th ed. 1955).

1a In 1939 an attempt by popular initiative to invest the Tribunal Federal with

such authority was decisively turned back.
HALL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 164.

CODDING,

op. cit. supra note 4, at 112; SAUSER•
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save that of Geneva, exercise this prerogative vis-a-vis its executive
or legislative departments. Thus, irrespective of what other constitutional provisions may be involved, the question is foreclosed
to decision by the judiciary if it concerns the schools. The Conseil
Federal stated, in 1888:
"One can only maintain that in reserving to the Conseil Federal recognition of appeals under Article 27 of the Federal
Constitution, the Federal Law on Organization of the Judiciary desired to entrust it with the judging of all appeals
whatsoever on school affairs whatsoever be the constitutional
provision which is violated." 14
But even the Conseil Federal and the Assembly enjoy only limited
authority in school matters. Article 27 speaks only of "primary
schools," and, consequently, secondary and university education
is exclusively under the control of the cantons.15 Six of the seven
universities in Switzerland are designated as Protestant, inasmuch
as their faculties of theology are Protestant. The seventh has a
Catholic faculty of theology. No one would ever contest the right
of the cantons so to organize their universities. 16 On their right
to establish secondary schools without regard to the demands of
article 27, the Conseil Federal ruled in 1877 that "secondary education is entirely under the power of the cantons. . . . Consequently, we have declared that the appeal is groundless in that
which concerns the points dealing with Article 27, paragraphs
two and three, of the Federal Constitution." 17 This ruling was
reiterated in 1897 in a case which involved the establishment of
a public secondary school under the direction of religious sisters.18
F.F. III, 755 (1888).
F.F. IV, 615, 648 (1897); F.F. 258 (1877); F.F. II, 84, 86 (1878). In the last case,
the Conseil Federal allowed itself to inquire into whether the school involved was
really a secondary school and not merely a primary school in disguise so as to escape
the demands of article 27. Satisfied on this score, it refused to hear the substantive
question for want of jurisdiction.
10 How does this arrangement comport with article 4 of the Swiss Constitution, which
reads: "All Swiss are equal before the Law"? Compare Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938), where the Supreme Court of the United States, applying the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, ruled that "the State was bound
to furnish him (the Negro applicant] within its borders facilities for legal education substantially equal to those which the State there afforded for persons of the white race."
(Emphasis added.)
17 F.F. 258 (1877). Paragraph two reads: "The Cantons provide for adequate primary
education, which shall be exclusively under the control of the civil authority. Such
education is compulsory and, in the public schools, free."
18 F.F. IV, 615, 648 (1896). Since paragraph three of article 27 speaks only of public
schools, unqualifiedly, the Conseil Federal has ruled at least once that the "liberty of
conscience" provision therein is not so restricted. F.F. II, 733 (1882). See also Marti,
Liberte de Croyance et des Cultes, in FICHE JURIDIQUE SUISSE 1071, at 3 (1950).
14
15

1074

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

In speaking of the jurisdiction of the Confederation in school
matters, it should be pointed out that the Conseil Federal has only
the indirect power of surveillance activated in individual cases
which come by way of appeal. Paragraph four of article 27 states
that "the confederation shall take the necessary measures against
Cantons which fail to fulfill these obligations [mentioned in paragraphs one through three]." Judging that this permitted the central government to legislate for the schools, the Assembly in 1882
authorized an official examination of education policies and practices in the cantons, preparatory to the subsequent enactment of
enforcement laws. 19 But, fearful of this first step into jealously
guarded territory, the Swiss people seized a constitutional weapon
afforded them in the optional referendum provided by article 121,
and defeated the decree of the Assembly by popular vote.20 This
ended efforts at direct federal control.
Enough has now been said concerning the restricted jurisdiction of the Confederation in school matters to consider the answers which would be given in Switzerland to plaintiffs with grievances such as those alleged in Engel v. Vitale. At the outset, it
can safely be said that in most, if not in all, Swiss schools religious
instruction is given; in a very large number of schools, prayers
are recited. The following constitutes a mere sampling from a
few cantons.
The public schools in the Protestant canton of Vaud, where
the National Evangelical Reformed Church is designated as the
state religion in article 13 of the cantonal constitution, give religious instruction in accordance with article 18 of its constitution,
19 5 SALIS, LE DROIT FEDERAL SUISSE 598-610 (1907). In his report on the need for
such federal laws, the Chief of the Department of the Interior made the following
remarks: "Indeed, if the Confederation is not able to have the orders it gives carried
out, if need be by force, it were better not to give those orders, which can only weaken
its authority when unfulfilled. . • • It can hardly think seriously of decreeing penal
prescriptions against the unconstitutional conduct of a school teacher, when, for instance,
if he expresses himself, from a religious point of view, in an aggressive manner offending
liberty of conscience and belief. No more can it send troops, as a form of punishment,
into a canton or commune on the grounds that the demands of Article 27 are not being
observed, especially if the dispute has its source in the domain of religion and faith.
But, even supposing that the Confederation were able, in a given case, to achieve its
ends by coercion, it would have to ask itself, at the outset, if the evil which results from
violence inflicted on an entire population would not be more considerable than the evil
which it desires to remedy. In school questions, as a general thesis, . • • not much is
gained by force." Id. at 601. The department chief concluded that the best means to
awaken laggard cantons to their constitutional responsibilities would be enlightened public
opinion plus the nudge of federal subsidies. Id. at 602. But when the subsidy law of
1903 was passed, it guaranteed that francs would not be used as a means of coercion.
Accordingly, the cantons dispense their federal stipends as they please. 4 REcuEIL
SYsrEMATIQUE DES LOIS ET ORDONNANCES 9 (art. V) (1848-1947).
20 HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 28.
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which provides: "In the public schools, religious instruction ought
to be conformed to the principles of Christianity and distinct from
other branches of learning."21 A special school law provides that
"school is opened by a prayer or by a hymn, or by a reading or
in any other educational manner, after which the instructor lists
immediately the absences in the school registry." 22 In Geneva,
the one canton in which complete separation of church and state
is said to prevail,23 religious instruction is permitted according
to article 137 of its constitution.24 The constitution of the Protestant canton of Neuchatel contains, in article 71, the following
provision: "Religious instruction is given freely in the public
schools under the care of the recognized Churches; for this purpose, the local schools are furnished gratuitously and favorable
hours are reserved." In article I 7 of the constitution of the canton of Fribourg, in which Catholics account for eighty-seven percent of the population, there is a stipulation that the schools shall
be "organized with a religious and patriotic direction," and that
"in this matter there be effective co-operation assured to the
clergy." In accordance with these provisions, Bible instruction
is offered, generally by a layman on the ordinary faculty, and
church doctrine is taught by the Protestant pastor or by the Catholic cure.25 The official Introduction au Plan d'Etudes for Fribourg schools is silent as to matters relating to religious instruction, in contrast to the official manual used for the Vaud schools
which details the aims and contents of the course in religion and
Bible. 26 This silence is attributable to the theory that, although
the state should cooperate with religious groups, the churches
themselves should be entirely free as to their teaching as well as
to their own internal organization. Prayers are said in the Fribourg schools, but participation is purely optional, and discretion
21 This religion course is detailed in the official PLAN D'ETUDES

ET

INSTRUCTIONS

GENERALES POUR LES EcoLES ENFANTINES ET LES EcoLES PRIMAIRES DU CANTON DE VAUD 18-21
(1960). Participation in the course is completely optional.
22 RiGLEMENT ScoLAIRE art. 281. Confirmed by letter to this writer, Aug. 6, 1962,

from Le Chef du Service de l'Enseignement Primaire, Lausanne, Vaud.
23 SAUSER-HALL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 164.
24 Also by article 18 de la loi sur !'instruction publique (Nov. 6, 1940). This article
provides that the instruction is to be optional and that the department of education is
to take steps to facilitate its organization. In a letter to this writer, the Secretary General
of the Department of Education said that "Aucune priere de caractere religieux n'est
recitce ou autorisee dans les classes." Letter of Sept. 3, 1962, Geneve. Likewise in the
canton of Neuchiitel, there is no provision made for prayers. Letter to this writer from
Le Chef du Departement de !'Instruction Publique, Aug. 30, 1962, Neuchiitel.
25 Confirmed in interviews with the Fribourg Minister of Public Instruction, July 18
and Sept. 19, 1962.
20 See note 21 supra.
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as to what formula is used is left to the individual teacher or
principal.27
Article 6 of the federal constitution requires that the constitutions of the cantons and any amendments added thereto must
be approved by the Confederation. The same article stipulates
that approval should be given only if they "contain nothing contrary to the provisions of the Federal Constitution." Article 85,
section 7, and article 102, sections 3 and 4, state that the two
legislative bodies and the executive are the competent and necessary organs of government for awarding this "guarantee" or sanction.
Thus, as is evident, no one could press a suit on the ground
that any of the several provisions in those cantonal constitutions
mentioned above are unconstitutional on their face. In the United
States this clearly could be done as a result of the holdings in
Engel v. Vitale28 and McCollum v. Board of Education.29 Should
someone in Switzerland urge that such provisions either constitute an establishment of religion or are inconsistent with separation of church and state, he would be told, first, that the Assembly as well as the Conseil Federal-the body hearing his appealhad already approved the challenged provisions and, second, that
the Conseil Federal had foreclosed the question by interpreting
the "sovereignty" clause of article 3 so as to guarantee to the cantons the right to maintain state churches.30 It would then be
necessary to attack the provision, law, or practice by alleging that
its application in the concrete case violated one of the "freedom
of religion and conscience" clauses in the federal constitution.
The following decisions of the Conseil Federal are pertinent,
even though the factual situation in none parallels exactly that
presented in Engel.
An 1887 ruling stated that a Catholic father could not be
compelled to send his Catholic daughter to the class in religion
given in the public primary school which she regularly attended.31
School authorities had argued that since the parent was not being
asked to send his child to the Protestant instruction, but only to
classes in her own faith, there was no possibility that conscience
or belief would be violated. But the Conseil Federal rebutted
this, asserting that paragraphs one, two and three of article 49
27 It is usually "the Lord's Prayer, or some other such prayer which could not possibly
offend any group." Interviews referred to in note 25 supra. See also note 44 infra.
28 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
29 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
so See ,materials cited in notes 9-12 supra.
31 F.F. IV, 83 (1887).
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were all infringed by such a demand; the father's authority over
the religious education of his children under sixteen was absolute,
and the state had no right to inquire into one's secret motives in
this area. "If the State [canton] wants to provide for religious
instruction in its schools and establishments of learning, it may
do so only if it makes it absolutely optional." 32 On the other hand,
if parents freely register their children for an optional religion
course, then the children must attend. Thus, the Conseil Federal
has upheld a fine imposed upon a father who permitted his child
to skip classes in religion; the man retained the right to withdraw
the child, but until he did so proper ordre scolaire could not
countenance merely casual attendance.33
In another decision, the Conseil Federal held that article 49
was infringed by public school authorities when they wrote on
the school certificate of a student that he "had been very negligent
in the fulfillment of his religious duties." 34 It also has ruled that,
even if the teaching is "non-confessional," the public schools cannot make it obligatory.35 Does Bible history come under such a
ban? This raises a highly interesting question of a substantive
and jurisdictional nature. In 1891, the Conseil Federal-the
only organ authorized to hear appeals in school matters-made a
distinction: paragraphs one through three of article 49, it said,
justified the demand made for exempting public school children
from school prayers, religious exercises and catechism instruction,
but not for excusing them from the class in Bible history. 36 Hows2 Id. at 88. But, in 1930, the Tribunal Federal was presented with this case: a child
was handed over to the guardianship of the canton of Geneva, after her parents had been
stripped of their parental rights. The teacher in the state institution, to which the child
was entrusted, continued to raise her in the faith of her parents, with their consent.
Subsequently they protested against this religious education, but the Tribunal Federal
rejected their appeal on the ground that the guardian now had the parental right in
education. Meeting an additional protest, it said: "As to the argument drawn from the
fact that the young Irene was placed in a State establishment whose essence is to be
neutral in the matter of religion, the supervising authority could not restrain it. . • •
In a desire to apply this principle, the conclusion would be reached that a child
placed in an establishment of this kind should not receive any religious education, a
thing in itself contrary to the neutrality of the state, and this even in opposition to the
will of parents. This is inadmissible." Lany v. Geneve, 53 LA SEMAINE JUDICIAIRE 138, 141
(1930). Not reported in Feuille Federate.
33 F.F. I, 474 (1893); F.F. II, 334 (1888); F.F. IV, 92 (1887).
34 F.F. II, 733 (1882).
35 F.F. II, 630 (1880).
1
36 F.F. II, 349, 552 (1892); F.F. II, 286, 290-91 (1891). Bible study was here judged to
be a course in history. In 1962 a lower federal court in the United States held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute providing for the reading, without comment, of ten verses
from the Bible in school. Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa.), prob.
Juris. noted, 371 U.S. 807 (1962). This, unlike the Swiss cases, is not a Bible study case.
Rather, the reading of the verses upon the opening of each class day seems similar to
the reciting of the prayer in the Engel case, except, of course, that no state official in
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ever, It IS the Tribunal Federal which has jurisdiction over appeals involving paragraph six of article 49. 37 This states that "no
one is obliged to pay taxes devoted especially to the special expenses of a ritual of a religious community to which he does
not belong." In a case involving this paragraph, the Tribunal
Federal declared it could not sustain the above distinction previously made by the Conseil Federal. 38 Accordingly, it would
seem that a taxpayer may refuse to pay taxes for the purchase
of Bible history books, but that his child might be compelled to
attend the Bible history class. 39 Article 27, paragraph three, provides that "the public schools shall be such that they may be attended by adherents of all religious sects without any offense to
their freedom of conscience or belief." Nonetheless, a student
may be compelled to take military training at school, since article
49, paragraph five, stipulates that "no one is released from performance of his civil duties by reason of his religious beliefs."40
In some communes, religious sisters are hired to teach in the
public primary schools. It has been argued before the Conseil
Federal that their very presence in the classroom, in distinctive
garb and with refined and modest comportment, makes them effective propagandists for a particular faith; and, moreover, that
their own beliefs would inevitably penetrate even their courses
in secular subjects.41 The Conseil Federal, while admitting the
strong possibility of these allegations, nonetheless dismissed the
appeal, which, it said, was based on "apprehensions" rather than
on "real tangible facts" that religious conscience was put in
jeopardy in the public schools. Only in the face of proof to the
contrary in a concrete case would the federal authority have the
right to intervene.42 In another similar case the Conseil Federal
Pennsylvania has composed the ten Bible verses selected for reading. See text at and
notes 21-22 supra for the law in the canton of Vaud on this practice in the public schools.
37 Lor FEDERALE D'ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE, Arts. 84(a), 125, 126(a) (1943).
ss REcuEIL OFFICIEL DES .Arutt-rs DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL XXIII, 1361, 1369 (1897). Note
that the case did not involve the school as such, i.e., its organization or course of studies,
but only a taxpayer. See note 42 infra.
39 Today this seems highly theoretical. From the school programs surveyed for the
present study, and from interviews made, this writer concludes that the cantonal authorities are most solicitous not to compel a child to attend any kind of a religious or Bible
history class.
40 F.F. II, 86 (1878). Cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
41 F.F. I, 411 (1880).
42 In this case, as in the "Bible" cases treated above, there arose the question of
whether the appellants could be compelled to pay taxes for the teachers' salaries. The
Conseil Federal contended that this was under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal Federal.
Id. at 430. The latter never ruled on the point. The practical interpretation today is
that article 49 permits the hiring of religious sisters as teachers-as long as they are
not administrators of the school-and the paying of their salaries with tax money.
Interview with the Fribourg Minister of Public Education, Sept. 19, 1962.
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stressed the point that article 27 aimed at eliminating teaching
which infringed religious liberty, not persons who might possibly
do so. 43
Although prayers are said in the public schools in many cantons, the practice never appears to have provoked parents to ask for
a ruling on the matter from the federal authorities. 44 However, the
principles set forth in the several cases cited above are clear indications as to how the Conseil Federal would rule were an appeal made
from the action of a school board of one of the cantons in authorizing a practice similar to that condemned in Engel v. Vitale. These
principles, as well as those invoked by the Supreme Court of the
United States in similar cases, will be seen in an interesting light
if one takes a synoptic view of the pertinent constitutional history
of the two countries.
When the American Constitution was drafted in 1789, it contained few restrictions on the states relative to the laws they might
pass in the area of civil and personal liberties. The Bill of Rights,
adopted in 1791, was clearly meant to bind the central government only.45 It is interesting that, among the several proposed
amendments which Madison presented to Congress in 1789, one
provided: "No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or
the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."46
Congress rejected even this limited interference with the states'
authority in religious matters. But at the same time it approved
the amendment which forbade Congress to: (I) establish a
national religion, (2) disestablish state churches, and (3) curtail
the free exercise of religion. Thus, as late as 1845, and for many
years thereafter, the prevailing doctrine was that set down by
the Supreme Court in Permoli v. Municipality of New Orleans:
"The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens
of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to
the state constitutions and laws." 47
F.F. II, 84 (1878).
In Vaud and in Fribourg where prayers are said in the public schools, it is not
clear whether the school authorities authorize a definite formula to be used. See notes
21-22, 27 supra. In the Engel case the school board had directed one particular prayer
to be recited, and this fact seems to have been the principal cause for the Court's adverse
decision. 370 U.S. at 425. Does the decision permit prayers if chosen democratically by the children by majority vote or if the selection is made by the teachers? In
the latter case, clearly it would be an agent of the state that would "impose" the prayer.
In the former situation, the teacher would certainly have to sanction the students' choice,
eliminate prayers clearly offensive, and ultimately "impose" the prayer thus "authorized"
on an unwilling minority.
45 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
46 ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 249; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 450 (1834) [1789-1791].
47 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845).
43
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The original Swiss Constitution, as it came from the hands of
its creators in 1848, was, in pertinent part, similar,48 except that
it armed the federal government somewhat more effectively for
action against cantonal laws restricting religious liberty. Article
48 thus read: "All the cantons are obliged to treat the citizens
of one of the other States of the Confederation as citizens of
their own State, in the matter of law and in all that concerns
juridic procedure."49 Article 41-without the several qualifying
paragraphs-stipulated: "The Confederation guarantees to every
Swiss of one of the Christian confessions, the right to settle freely
throughout the whole extent of Swiss territory, in conformity
with the following dispositions .... " 50 (These "dispositions" are
here omitted.) Article 44 stated that "the free exercise of worship
for the recognized Christian religions is guaranteed throughout
the Confederation." 51 Such power of intervention into the states'
affairs was never entrusted to the federal government by the drafters of the American Constitution nor by those who ratified the
Bill of Rights. However, the more explicit guarantees now included in articles 27 and 49 of the present Swiss Constitution were
not included in the 1848 document. It was not until the revision
of 1874 that the Constitution authorized the central government
to intervene in school matters and in the general area of churchstate relations if the cantons should infringe freedom of conscience
and belief. 52
48 The "sovereignty" clause in article 3, like the tenth amendment, encompasses by
implication the right to establish state churches. This right was spelled out in explicit
Iangnage in the first amendment to the American Constitution; that is, one of the
principal motives of those demanding the "respecting" clause was a desire to obtain
a guarantee that the states could continue to legislate freely in the church-state area.
The debates in the state ratifying conventions in 1788 are clear on this point. James
Iredell of North Carolina (a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 1790-1799) seems to have summarized the aspirations of most delegates who addressed themselves to the matter: "Each
state must be left to the operation of its own principles." 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 244 (Elliott ed. 1861). See
also I id. 44, 80, 87, 100, 114, 118, 362; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 431-42, 450, 600-65, 729, 730
(1834) [1789-1791].
49 See note 51 infra. This guarantee is now in articles 60 and 61.
50 This "freedom of movement" or "freedom of settlement" guarantee is now in
article 45, with the religion qualification omitted, and with certain other changes. Be•
cause of the many exceptions and because the cantons and the communes still retain
considerable authority in the matter, the freedom granted in article 45 is much less
complete than in the United States. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
51 Note the similarity between articles 44 and 45 and the "full faith and credit"
clause and the "privileges and immunities" clause in article IV of the American Constitu•
tion. For an interpretation of the latter, see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1875); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
52 For a history of the revision, see RAPPARD, LA CONSTITUTION FEDERALE DE LA
SUISSE 1848-1948, at 271-89 (1948); RAPPARD, L'INDIVIDU ET L'ETAT (1936). For a discussion
of the addition of article 49, see CLERC, LEs PRINCIPES DE LA LIBERTE RELIGIEUSE EN DROIT
PUBLIC SUISSE 1-62 (1937). Article 50, added in 1874, grants freedom of worship to all.
Thus the restriction in article 44 of the 1848 Constitution no longer exists.
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Almost contemporaneously, the fourteenth amendment was
added to the American Constitution, which, like the above-mentioned revisions in the Swiss Constitution, empowered the federal
government to protect individuals in the states against abuses of
authority by their state or local governments. 53 An additional striking parallel will appear if section 5 of this amendment54 is juxtaposed with the final paragraphs of articles 27 and 49 of the Swiss
Constitution. 55 In each instance, the wording strongly suggests
that legislation by the appropriate branches of the respective
countries' governments was envisaged as the proper initial step
toward implementation of the constitutional "freedom" guarantees. However, in neither country has such a legislative achievement been realized. 56 Thus, in Switzerland, enforcement of the
guarantees against non-complying cantons can be demanded only
after an appeal either to the Conseil Federal or to the Tribunal
Federal57 by some aggrieved individual. In the United States, even
without implementing legislation, the federal courts regularly entertain such appeals, and, if need be, bequeath enforcement duties
to the executive. 58
A final point, one of transcendent importance, concerns "establishment" vis-a-vis the "freedom" guarantees in the two constitutions here under scrutiny. The federal constitution of Switzerland,
as the above discussion indicates, is replete with detailed "liberty"
provisions which concern the schools and the churches. But it
does not prohibit the cantons from establishing official state religions. On the contrary, the "sovereignty" article guarantees to
them the right to maintain a union between state and church; 59
and, by reason of the same guarantee, the Confederation is forbidden to establish a national church. As mentioned previously,60
the Constitution of the United States originally presented an
53 The pertinent part of the fourteenth amendment reads: "No state may make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deny to any person life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
54 "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the above
provisions of this Amendment."
65 Article 27, paragraph four: "The Confederation will take the necessary measures
against cantons which fail to fulfill these obligations." Article 49, paragraph six, sentence
two: "The exact execution of this principle is reserved to federal legislation."
56 See note 19 supra.
57 Depending upon the type of case. See notes 14, 37, 38, and 42 supra, and accompanying text.
58 Supreme Court decisions are the "supreme law of the land," and article II
states that the President "shall see that the laws are faithfully observed."
59 See notes 9-12, 26 supra, and accompanying text.
60 See notes 45-48 supra.
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exact parallel to that of Switzerland in this regard. To what extent was the fourteenth amendment designed to rearrange this
reservation of power? With reference to this amendment, the
Supreme Court stated in 1922: "The Constitution of the United
States imposes upon the States no obligation to confer upon those
within their jurisdiction either the right of free speech or the
right of silence." 61 This language was, of course, meant to encompass all the guarantees in the Bill of Rights; nor was this
interpretation novel, as previous decisions testify. 62 Subsequently,
however, the Court has held that, by reason of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, all the guarantees of the
first amendment are constitutionally protected against action by
the states. 63
Since the Court itself has rejected complete "incorporation," 64
constitutional historians may find themselves somewhat uneasy
over the theory of "selective assimilation." 65 It must, indeed, be
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922). See also id. at 543.
Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 327 (1868); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (1868) is particularly
pertinent, since the sole question in that case concerned a religious matter. Moreover,
New Hampshire had approved the fourteenth amendment in July 1866, and it became
part of the Constitution just five months before the Hale decision. Nonetheless, there is
not a single reference to this amendment, even in the 143-page opinion of the dissenting
judge who supported the heterodox minister. The majority opinion of 83 pages
mentioned the first amendment only once, and then to prove that "the whole power
over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments." Id. at 124.
63 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
64 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947).
65 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). As regards the "assimilation" or "incorporation" theory, the following discussion may prove helpful. The original Constitution did not-except in a few instances-authorize the federal government to protect
the personal liberty of an individual against abuses by his state government. Nor did
the Bill of Rights, adopted in 1791, change this arrangement, since it related only to
action by the federal government. But the fourteenth amendment was intended to bring
the individual definitely under the protective arm of the central government's power.
Some have argued that its purpose was to make all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
binding upon the states. However, the majority of the Supreme Court has consistently
held that only "selected" guarantees are made applicable under tl1e fourteenth amend•
ment, specifically by the due process clause. Accordingly, over the years, the Court has
"assimilated" or "incorporated" by this "selective" process only those liberties or rights
which it has deemed to be most basic or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Thus, it has held that all the freedoms of the first amendment, being fundamental
freedoms, will be protected against state infringement by the federal government. On
the other hand, the right to a trial by jury in a criminal case need not be offered by
the states, since it is not considered to be of so basic a character. In other words, a fair
trial can be had and justice and liberty preserved even if jury trials are not provided.
The experience of other highly civilized and democratic nations prove this point, and
the Court has indicated clearly in several opinions that it takes such experience into
account when applying the principle of "selective assimilation." But liberty could not
Iona endure if the states denied freedom of speech, as history both remote and near so
tragically demonstrates. Thus, it is the quality of each guarantee in the Bill of Rights
which the Court examines before determining whether the state governments must
61
62
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admitted that historians can amass convincing arguments against
any incorporation. 00 The thrust of logic is equally forceful: incorporate all the freedoms of the Bill of Rights or incorporate
none. What the drafters of the fourteenth amendment really intended, and what the states thought they had ratified, are questions that probably will never be answered with complete satisfaction. Nonetheless, the Palko case opinion of Mr. Justice
Cardozo does seem to grasp the general spirit of the era and to
capture the hopes and aspirations of the people at that time. 67
Fortunately, these thorny problems which concern the assimilation of the liberty clauses of the first eight amendments need not
be touched in this study. But the establishment clause is most
pertinent here, and the questions relating to its assimilation must
be considered. Since that clause does not in itself contain a "freedom" provision, 68 and since religious establishments can and do
exist without infringement of religious liberty, there would appear to be no logical reason whatsoever for its incorporation into
the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, several competent constitutional Ia-wyers have urged that the Court abandon the assimilation of this provision of the first amendment, 69 and further elaboration of this crucial point seems desirable. Since the Court has
rejected the theory of "complete incorporation," the states are not
bound by any particular provision of the Bill of Rights unless
failure to abide by such provision would be a denial of "liberty
without due process of law." Moreover, the freedom involved,
the Court has held, must be a basic freedom, that is, one "implicit
extend it to its people. Proponents of "total incorporation" would make every one of
the guarantees applicable regardless of its relative value in the scheme of ordered liberty.
On this general matter, see, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Twining v.
New Jersey, 2ll U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). See also notes 62
and 63 supra.
oo Professor Stanley Morrison concluded that there was an "absence of any adequate
support for the incorporation theory." Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. R.Ev. 140, 173 (1949).
07 Professor Charles Fairman, who rejects the theory of complete incorporation, has
written this of the Palko decision: "Cardozo's gloss on the due process clause ... comes
as close as one can to catching the vague aspirations that were hung upon the privileges
and immunities clause." Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. R.Ev. 5, 139 (1949).
68 To this writer it seems appropriate to note that the constitutions of Russia,
Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Outer Mongolia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia all
carry "separation" or "non-establishment" provisions. This underscores the fact that
such provfaions do not in themselves secure religious freedom, especially where governments are actively attempting to destroy any established religion.
oo See, e.g., Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 19 (1949); Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH.
U.L.Q. 497 (1942); Kauper, The First Ten Amendments, 37 A.B.A.J. 717 (1951); Note,
67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1016 (1954).
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in the concept of ordered liberty," 70 before it qualifies for incorporation. The guarantee of religious freedom clearly fits within
this definition. But in Engel v. Vitale the Supreme Court seemingly decided that states are forbidden to engage in any practice
which the Court determines to be contrary to the establishment clause, even if the practice should leave religious freedom
unimpaired.71 Thus, it appears that the Court is now justifying
the incorporation of the non-establishment provision without reference to the "ordered liberty" principle, which, nonetheless, is
the only justification which its majority has accepted for assimilating any clause of the Bill of Rights.
Turning to Switzerland, there at least seventeen cantons have
state religions, and the other cantons all authorize practices, such
as religious instruction or prayers in the public schools, which the
Supreme Court of the United States has forbidden in America.
England has a national church, and the Lutheran Church is
established in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
The people in these countries would be surprised, probably quite
indignant, if informed that, according to the Supreme Court's
formula, all of these practices and church-state arrangements are
in themselves contrary to what is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." Yet, the logic of the Engel decision, read in the
light of the Palko principle, seemingly compels such a conclusion.
The chink in the Court's armor will be further exposed by
reflection upon this not impossible situation: If in America one
state or one community were to decide by unanimous vote to permit prayers and religious instruction in its public schools, would
the state or community be flouting the Engel ruling? Would it
be acting contrary to what is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"? If so, it is fair to ask, what concept and whose liberty?
Assuming that all the school money involved came exclusively
from the state or community, there would be no aggrieved person
to carry a legal suit to the courts. Nonetheless, would not the
practice be contrary to the supreme law of the land as now interpreted by the Court? Even without orders from the judiciary,
would not the state or community be bound in conscience to perform a heroic act of collective self-abnegation, and to abandon
such school programs? Of course, this action would deny freedom
to one hundred percent of the people (in the case of this hypothetical), but such sacrifice would be compelled by the principle
70
71

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
See note 3 supra.
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that somehow a basic concept of "ordered liberty" has been compromised. It is the opinion of this writer that these questions are
appropriate and do help to underscore the weakness in the Engel
decision.
It would seem, then, that to be· logical and to maintain consistency in constitutional principles, the Court should retreat from
the position it has taken, and base its decisions in state cases involving religious matters solely on the freedom clause of the first
amendment. As to this present study in comparative law, it is
interesting to note that adoption of this approach would restore
the exact parallel-as concerns religious matters-between the
present federal constitution of Switzerland and that of the United
States prior to the latter-day incorporation of the non-establishment principle. That is, the federal government in each country
would continue to be the final arbiter in disputes regarding religious freedom and the guardian of the religious liberty of all individuals within the states or cantons. It would, however, refrain
from interfering with a multitude of possible experiments in
church-state cooperation, which judges may not like or might
even deem attributes of religious establishments, but which recommend themselves to the people as likely solutions to disturbing
problems in a disturbed and changing world. In Switzerland, as
indicated above, most cantons do have official churches. Although
the Swiss people seem convinced that such arrangements enlarge
rather than shrink religious liberty, there is little likelihood that
the American states would or ever should follow the Swiss in this
regard, even if they were released from federal control in the
matter; their own state constitutions stand as barriers against such
eventuality.
If these suggestions as to incorporation were accepted, what
would be the practical effect in such cases as Engel v. Vitale and
Mccollum v. Board of Education? First, for plaintiffs in these
cases, once the "wall" argument was removed, they would have to
take a firm position on the only piece of constitutional terrain left
to them-that provided by the freedom clause of the first amendment. This would force. all parties in a dispute to focus their attention more sharply on the only issue of religious freedom which
is central to the whole problem. Secondly, abandonment of incorporation of the establishment clause would free the Court from
"the tyranny of a label" 72 which frequently results in preoccupa72 Mr. Justice Cardozo once observed that "a fertile source of perversion in Constitutional theory is the tyranny of labels." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114
(1934). In a later case, he wrote: "The tyranny of labels ••. must not lead us to leap
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tion with a mere abstraction while promoting inattention to questions of substantial justice in the concrete.73 In the past, social
justice and economic freedom for the American people were
victims of such unrealistic conceptualism on the part of the judiciary. 74 The present Supreme Court seems equally in bondage to
conceptual thinking. 75 The American people are currently beset
by serious problems in areas where education and religion meet.
The Court lends them no aid in solving these problems, nor is the
Court itself "responsibly aided by the uncritical invocation of metaphors like 'the wall of separation.' " 16
to a conclusion that a word which in one set of facts may stand for oppression or
enormity is of like effect in every other." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
This quotation seems particularly applicable to the word "establishment."
73 A comment of Professor Freund is apposite: "If the Court has on the whole been
more successful in finding serviceable accommodations under the Commerce Clause between a national free market and the claims of local welfare than under the First
Amendment between liberty of the mind and the claims of public order, one reason
may be the more empiric, particularistic approach that has generally characterized the
performance of the former role." Freund, Foreword: The Year of the Steel Case, 66
HARV. L. REv. 89, 97 (1952).
74 For instance, the aphorism "freedom of contract," which, as applied by past Courts,
meant actually a denial of freedom to millions of workers. Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). Likewise, the sophism "the power to tax is the power to destroy." In
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
said that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." Subsequent Courts interpreted
this as "the power to tax is the power to destroy," and then, by a doctrinaire application,
built up a monstrous intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine relating to both state
and federal government. This dried up revenue resources, threw an added burden on
ta.'>'.payers, and often put private business at an unjust disadvantage with certain government enterprises. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone tried for years to get the Court
to look at the facts in each case before deciding whether or not the tax actually destroyed.
The power to legislate also involves the power to destroy, but the function of courts
and of democratic institutions is to see that no particular law does in fact destroy. Mr.
Justice Holmes observed, "[T]he power to tax is not the power to destroy while this
Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). The Court finally abandoned the sophistic truism in Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
75 In addition to the metaphor "a wall of separation,'' the "three pence only" argument of Mr. Justice Black seems like another manifestation of unrealistic thinking. Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 436. It is true that a person might possibly, in some countries and
in some eras, be forced to conform ultimately to a religious establishment by "the
same authority" that ta.'>'.ed him, in the beginning, "three pence only." But the facts
are that, in America, such religious coercion has not followed, even though ever since
1789 the federal government has been "forcing" people to contribute ta.x money for
chaplains, for prayers, and for chapels. If Holmes were alive, perhaps bis sense of
realism would prompt him to say "neither prayer nor pence will force religious conformity while this Court sits." See note 74 supra. See notes 42, 43 supra, and accompanying text, for examples of how authorities in Switzerland examine the facts of each case
in true Holmesian fashion rather than apply some general doctrinaire formula.
76 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).

